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COMPULSORY OIL AND GAS UNITIZATION:
EFFECT ON OVERRIDING ROYALTY OBLIGATIONS
A

HYPOTHETICAL JUDGMENT OF THE HIGH COURT OF JURISTIC REVIEW
IN

PETER Fox BREWING Co. v. SoHIO PETROLEUM Co.•

Maurice H. Merrillt

J

us, CHIEF JUSTICE. As should be well known, our practice is to
sit in review of decisions presenting elements of difficulty, and
concerning the propriety of which there seems reason for doubt.
We have no jurisdiction to reverse, to modify, or to affirm. Our
judgment must be confined to approval or to disapprobation, or to
some position between these two extremes.
The principal case, as determined in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois1 and as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,2 appears to be a matter
peculiarly apt for our examination. It is not alone that the decision
is on important questions of law which were hotly contested and
closely debated. There is the further consideration that the points
determined were of first impression, involving construction of the
statutory law of a distant jurisdiction and application of that law
in a context not familiar to those sitting in judgment. If these
points were determined improperly, the effect of the precedent, if
we allow it to go unexamined, may be most unfortunate. Of course,
even should we come to the conclusion that the disposition was
wrong, this misfortune may not be avoided. Courts with more
mundane competence than ours may accept the authority of the
decisions. But, at least, we shall have made available our views.

I.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

In some respects, our statement of facts will be more in detail
than that contained in the opinions filed by the courts under review. However, it does not alter the essential bases of the litigation.
The additional detail serves merely to clarify the legal issues
involved.
Fox and Schmitz, hereinafter designated for convenience as
• 296 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1961), affirming 189 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
Research Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma.-Ed.
l Peter Fox Brewing Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 189 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. III. 1960).
2 296 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1961).

t
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F, owned certain oil leases on land in Oklahoma.8 By contract,
hereinafter referred to as the Agreement, executed August 20,
1943, F contracted with the Standard Oil Company of Ohio, hereinafter referred to as S,4 to assign these leases to S in return for a
cash consideration and other stipulations which, so far they are
important, are specified hereinafter. By the terms of the Agreement and of the effectuating assignments, F reserved, as to all the
leases "as a group,"

" ... an overriding royalty (free and clear of all development
and operating expense) . . . of one-half of the crude oil, gas,
casinghead gas, and other hydro-carbons produced, saved and
marketed from said leasehold premises or the proceeds thereof
accruing to the working interests assigned and transferred
hereunder to Standard or its nominee, subject, however, to a
deduction from said one-half (½) of the following items:
". . . (b) That quantity of crude oil, gas, casinghead gas,
and other hydro-carbons, or the proceeds thereof, which at
current well market prices at the time of sale thereof, shall be
equal in value to $200 per each producing well per month,
except that in the event that any well producing oil in paying
quantities shall at the same time produce water in excess of
10% of the total fluid produced from the well, then as to that
well during such period while such condition shall exist the
deduction shall be that quantity of crude oil, gas, casinghead
gas, and other hydro-carbons, or the proceeds thereof which at
current well market prices at the time of sale thereof shall be
equal in value to $250 per month."
If this subtraction, and other authorized deductions which now
have become obsolete, produced a deficit for any month, F was to
be under no duty to make up the deficit, but such deficits were to
be carried forward and deducted from net amounts due F in the
future "until such deficit or deficits shall have been liquidated."
Obviously, under such an arrangement, some wells might decline
in production to a point indicating permanent unprofitability to
F. As a safeguard against such an outcome, F was permitted to
3 While we speak of Fox and Schmitz only in the role of plaintiffs, actually, as the
result of various transfers of interest, many persons came to occupy the position of plaintiffs and some were divested of their interests during the progress of the litigation. Our
concentration upon the individuals Fox and Schmitz is in the interest of simplicity.
4 Actually, Standard later transferred its interests to its wholly owned subsidiary,
Sohio Oil Company. In the interest of simplicity, we shall ignore this transfer, which in
no way altered the legal picture, and shall continue to use the letter S to designate
Standard or Sohio, whichever at the moment was the owner of the leases.
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tender to S an assignment of "all right, title or interest in and to
the overriding royalty reserved herein in so far as the same related
or pertains to" any well as to which the amounts payable did not
exceed the amounts deductible for ninety days or more. Thereafter, computations of overriding royalties were to be made without reference to the production from wells so released.
S, in turn, assumed obligations to F. It agreed to shut in no
paying well except for necessary repair or reconditioning work or
for compliance with state or federal regulation.I' It agreed to develop and operate the properties "in a good and workmanlike
manner at all times," 6 and agreed that producing wells should be
kept "at the maximum rate of production" allowed by the state
or federal authority having jurisdiction.7 It agreed to render to F
monthly itemized statements of receipts and disbursements, to give
F "pertinent information" concerning drilling and operations, and
to permit F to examine relevant books and records. 8 S, while retaining full discretion as to the development and operation of the
premises, agreed to manage and develop the entire premises "to
the mutual benefit of both parties and in compliance at all times
with the 'prudent operator' rule." 9 In case of failure to offset wells
on adjoining land, S agreed that there should be reassigned to F,
on demand, forty acres centered about the site where the offset
should have been drilled. 10 S was to give F thirty days notification
of the intended abandonment of any well, whereupon F was to
have the option, within twenty days, to request a reassignment of
the forty acres surrounding that well upon paying S the fair value
of the equipment connected with the well. Upon such reassignment the well, its production, and the reassigned area were to be
excluded from the provisions_ of the agreement. 11
This contract became effective. The assignments were made.
S took over the development and operation of the assigned leases.
Thereafter, at its 1945 session, the Oklahoma Legislature enacted a
statute authorizing the compulsory merging of oil and gas properties tapping a common source of supply for the purpose of unitized
operation.12 Under this statute, the West Edmond Hunton Lime
Agreement § 5.
a Id. § 6.
7 Id.§ 5.
s Id.§ 6.
9 Id.§ 8.
10 Ibid.
11 Id. § I!I.
12 Okla. Sess. Laws 1945, tit. 52, ch. 3b.
IS
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Unit was created, effective October 1, 1947. It embraced, along
with other properties, all the leases then covered by the Agreement.
The production from these leases was from the Hunton Lime. S
became the Unit Operator, under the supervision of the Operating
Committee of the Unit. In 1951 the original unitization statute was
repealed. 13 However, it was replaced by a substitute law14 which,
insofar as the matters involved in this litigation are concerned, was
practically identical with the prior law. For that reason, reference
will be made to the present statute, under which the Unit now is
operating.15 The details of the operation of these laws, as they affect the problem at hand, will be developed more fully in the
appropriate portions of this opinion.
In the due course of the unitized operation, a number of the
wells subject to the Agreement were abandoned as producing wells.
The tracts on which these abandoned wells were located continued
to share in the unit production according to the percentage assigned
to them in connection with the unitization. Despite the discontinuance of these wells, S persisted in subtracting from the share of
the return apportioned to each such tract the monthly decrement
provided for in the Agreement.16 Likewise, it made that same
deduction for the wells continued in operation. This was done in
reliance upon those provisions of the unitization statute reading:
"Property rights, leases, contracts, and all other rights and
obligations shall be regarded as amended and modified to the
extent necessary to conform to the provisions and requirements of this Act and to any valid and applicable plan of
unitization or order of the Commission made and adopted
pursuant hereto, but otherwise to remain in full force and
effect . ... The amount of the unit production allocated to each
separately-owned tract within the unit, and only that amount,
regardless of the well or wells in the unit area from which it
may be produced, and regardless of whether it be more or less
than the amount of the production from the well or wells,
if any, on any such separately-owned tract, shall for all intents,
uses and purposes be regarded and considered as production
from such separately-owned tract, and, except as may be other1a Okla. Sess. Laws 1951, tit. 52, ch. 3b, § 16.
14 Now OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 287.1-.15 (1961).
15 Cf. Palmer Oil Corp. v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 343 U.S. 390 (1952), upholding
the unitization legislation in litigation commenced before the repeal and substituted
enactment, the Supreme Court of the United States having been "advised by the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma that this repeal had no effect on these causes."
16 Agreement § 4.
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wise authorized in this Act, or in the plan of unitization approved by the Commission, shall be distributed among or the
proceeds thereof paid to the several persons entitled to share
in the production from such separately-owned tract in the
same manner, in the same proportions, and upon the same
conditions that they would have participated and shared in the
production or proceeds thereof from such separately owned
tract had not said unit been organized and with the same legal
force and effect."11
The deductions taken by S have produced a deficit, as to many
of the tracts, in the share accruing to the overriding royalty. Further, the allocable proportion under the unitized operation has
resulted in less monthly revenue to the tracts under the Agreement
than was realized under individual operation.
In consequence, plaintiffs below, some original owners of and
some successors to the F interests, filed this suit against S to reform
the agreement by eliminating the provision for the per well deduction, as being in conflict with the Oklahoma unitization law and
the actual unitization agreement, and as being frustrated in its
contractual object by the operation of the unitization agreement.
Plaintiffs asked an accounting covering the sums which would have
been due to the F interests under the contract as reformed from
the date of unitization. At law they sought a money judgment on
the theory that, as the enactment of the unitization statute and the
creation of the unit ipso facto invalidated the provision for the perwell deduction, no reformation was actually necessary; in any event,
they contended, elimination of the deductions as to the abandoned
wells did not require reformation. The trial court denied all relief,
and the court of appeals affirmed this denial in all respects.
In reviewing these determinations, we shall enumerate, first,
certain general elementary principles which seem to us basic for
the proper solution of the problems presented by the litigation.
Then we shall discuss, in greater detail, the specific issues requiring
answer in order to provide the correct determination of these problems.

II.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

A. The Agreement, relating to an interest in Oklahoma land18
and necessitating performance in Oklahoma, is governed by Okla11 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.9 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
18 Black v. Wickett, 146 Okla. 191, 293 Pac. 782 (1930).
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homa law as to validity,19 and as to obligations of performance.20
B. By the Oklahoma statutes, performance of the Agreement
has become illegal to such extent as may be necessary to conform to
the unitization law and to the Plan of Unitization of the West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit adopted in pursuance thereof. The
Agreement and the rights and obligations thereunder must be
regarded as amended and modified to that extent.21
C. By the Oklahoma statutes: "A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties, as
it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful."22 "The whole of a contract is to be taken together,
so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each
clause helping to interpret the others.''23 "A contract must receive
such an interpretation as will make it lawful, operative, definite,
reasonable and capable of being carried into effect, if it can be done
without violating the intention of the parties."24 "However broad
may be the terms of a contract, it extends only to those things concerning which it appears that the parties intended to contract."25
D. By the law of Oklahoma, "A contract may be explained by
reference to the circumstances under which it was made, and the
matter to which it relates." 26 Hence testimony may be received to
establish these matters.27
E. Under these principles, it is clear that, in determining the
extent to which the Agreement is not in harmony with the provisions and requirements of the unitization law, a particular provision may not be read in isolation. A portion of the Agreement may
not be sustained simply because there is no verbal inconsistency
between it and the statute. It must be read in connection with
related clauses, to determine the general intent of the parties, in
the light of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
contract, as shown by the evidence and by circumstances of which
the court may take judicial notice; that general intent must be
19 R.EsrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § ll60(1) (19ll4).
20 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 162 (1961); 2 BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAws § ll46.6
RICH, CONFLICT OF LAws ll40 (3d ed. 1949); R.EsrATEMENT,
cit.
note
21 OKLA. STAT, tit. 52, § 287.9 (1961).
22 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 152 (1961).
23 OKLA. STAT, tit. 15, § 157 (1961).
24 OKLA, STAT, tit. 15, § 159 (1961).
25 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 164 (1961).
26 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 16ll (1961).
27 Harjo v. Harjo, 207 Okla. 73, 247 P.2d 522 (1952); Tyer v. Caldwell,

op.

supra

(1935); Goon•
19, § ll58.

114 Okla. lll,
242 Pac. 760 (1926); Withington v. Gypsy Oil Co., 68 Okla. lll8, 172 Pac. 6ll4 (1918); cf.
Union Sugar Co., lll Cal. 2d l!OO, 188 P.2d 470 (1948).
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effectuated, if this can be done lawfully. If the parties' intent cannot be lawfully effectuated, the provisions relative thereto must be
regarded as "amended and modified to the extent necessary to conform to the provisions of this [unitization] Act ...." 28

III.

EFFECT OF UNITIZATION ON THE AGREEMENT

The argument for the plaintiffs below rested first upon the
proposition that the provision for the deductions from the overriding royalty was based upon a method of operation which was
forbidden by the Oklahoma unitization statute and was abandoned
in response to the statutory command. Hence, they contended, the
provision for that deduction must fall because of its inconsistence
with the new legislative scheme. We think that this argument is
sound for the following reasons.
By the terms of the Agreement, which, as we have seen, must be
read as a whole, S was to develop and operate the assigned land on
an individual basis as to each t~act, utilizing its own judgment and
discretion, but in competition with other tracts in the field. It was
required to protect the assigned tracts against drainage from wells
on adjacent land. It was required so to operate each tract as to
secure the maximum production allowable by the state or federal
authority having jurisdiction. It agreed to operate and develop the
individual properties in a good and workmanlike manner at all
times, and to manage and develop them in compliance with the
"prudent operator" rule, which requires the exercise of reasonable
diligence and care adequately to explore, develop, operate, and
protect the property on an individual lease basis.29 S was not to
shut down any paying well producing oil or gas, except for repairs,
for reconditioning, or in accordance with an order of a state or
federal officer, board, or agency. S was required to tender to Fa
reassignment of tracts on which it determined to abandon wells,
together with these wells.
All these provisions constitute an integrated scheme whereby
the assigned units were to be developed to, and operated at, maximum productivity. Thereby the F interests were given the utmost
possible assurance against the contingency that the per-well
monthly deductions might create deficits which would reduce their
income or which, perhaps, might reduce future royalties. These
28 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.9 (1961).
20 See MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN

authorities there cited.

On.

AND

GAS LEAsEs

§

122 (2d ed. 1940) and
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provisions are so essential in reducing the risk of deficits that they
must be taken to be "the basis on which" F "assented to the bargain" and to create "a major part-an essential part-of the value
of one of the performances (the per-well deduction] that the parties" agreed "to exchange."80 As such, their continued effectiveness
is "necessarily inherent in the actual performance of the contract,"81
and cessation of the contract constitutes a fact which modifies the
promise of F in respect to the per-well deduction. Therefore the
express development and operation obligations undertaken by S
are implied conditions on F's liability for the per-well deduction. 82
They are, in the language of the Oklahoma statute, the "object" of
F's assent to the deduction,83 and the "consideration" therefor.a,
The Oklahoma statutory law and the plan of unitization
adopted under its authority, however, wipe out all these stipulations in the following manner:
A. For the judgment and discretion of S, the unitization substitutes the direction of the Operating Committee of the Unit. By
statute the unit plan is to provide for "an operating committee to
have general over-all management and control of the unit and the
conduct of its business and affairs and the operations carried on
by it. " 85 The West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit Plan of U nitization
constitutes the Operating Committee with a membership of one
representative from each lessee within the unit area.86 In addition
to giving the Committee general authority in the words of the
statute,87 the Plan specifically vests the Committee with power to
determine the extent of drilling operations and development; 88
with designation of which wells shall produce and at what rate; 811
with the approval or disapproval of plans of development or operation to be submitted to regulatory bodies having jurisdiction over
the subject matter; 40 and with the prerogative to "direct and consult
with the Unit Operator in all matters pertaining to the duties and
functions of the Unit Operator." 41 The Unit Operator is expressly
6 CORBIN, CONTRAcrs § 1355, at 465 (1962).
5 WILusroN, CoNTRAcrs § 668 (3d ed. 1961).
82 Ibid.
83 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 101 (1961).
84 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 106 (1961).
85 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.4(e) (1961).
86 Plan of Unitization, West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit [hereinafter referred to as
Plan], § VIIl(l).
87 Id. § VIII(2).
38 Id. § VIII(2)(d).
311 Id. § VIII(2)(f).
40 Id. § VIII(2)(l).
41 Id. § VIII(2)(n).
80

81
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required to carry on and conduct "operations in connection with
the development and the operation of the Unit Area for Oil and
Gas ... in accordance with the instructions of the Operating Committee."42 This is in entire accord with the theory of unit operation,
under which "the lessee surrenders to the discretion of the unit
management the power to carry out" his obligations, express and
implied, to other interests.43 However, it is entirely inconsistent
with the obligations assumed by S in the Agreement.
The extent to which these provisions require that the determinations of the Unit Operating Committee supplant the judgment and discretion of S is illustrated by West Edmond Hunton
Lime Unit v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.44 In that case, the Unit was
granted specific performance of a directive of the Unit Operating
Committee, requiring the defendant, a lessee of land embraced in
the unitized area, to turn over to the control of the Operating
Committee a well which had been completed to produce oil from
both the Hunton Lime and the Bartlesville Sand overlying the
Hunton Lime. The well was to be transferred in such condition as
to be capable of production from the Hunton Lime only. The Unit
was also granted an injunction forbidding the defendant from using
the well bore and equipment for production from the Bartlesville
formation. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that
the Unit Operating Committee's orders could be reviewed only to
determine whether they were "arbitrary, capricious and without
any rational basis in fact. " 45 It held that, in view of the evidence as
to the possible adverse effect upon the activities of the Unit in the
exploitation of the Hunton Lime, the prohibition against dual
production from the two sands could not be held to be "arbitrary
or capricious." Rather, it was "founded upon the technical knowledge and judgment of those charged with the duty and responsibility of managing and operating the unit." 46 Thus we see that, as to
this matter, as the court of appeals said, "the decision is not committed to the owners of the dually completed wells...." 47 As a
result of this decision, we see that the freedom of S to exercise its
best judgment and discretion in the operation of the assigned tracts,
as required by the Agreement, has been subjected to the control of
Id. § X, at 12.
43 See Jacobs, Unit Operation of Oil and Gas Fields, 57 YALE L.J. 1207, 1220 (1948).
44 193 F.2d 818 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 920 (1952).
45 Id. at 824.
411 Id. at 825.
47 Id. at 823.
42
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the Operating Committee of the Unit, not only with respect to
the Hunton Lime production, but also, to an important extent,
with respect to the ability to produce from any other sand in the
field which is not taken into the unit for exploitation. For instance,
if twin wells must be drilled on any of these properties to exploit
the Bartlesville Sand, provisions of section 4(b) of the Agreement
would inflict upon F a doubling of the deduction as to that tract,
although, but for the directive in question, the production from
the two sands could be secured from a single well, with a single
deduction. Obviously, in such a matter, the judgment and discretion of Sis superseded by that of the Unit Operating Committee,
contrary to the provisions of the Agreement.
That this is no chimera is demonstrated by the Report of the
Engineering Sub-Committee of the Unit, dated January 27, 1953,
from which it appears that, as to wells embraced within the Agreement of August 20, 1943, S indicated a desire to produce from the
Bartlesville Sand, as well as from the Hunton, on seven tracts of
the unit. Its discretion in this respect, however, was subjected to
the oversight of the Sub-Committee and the Operating Committee.
The report listed, as to those wells, the future destiny recommended
for each of them in the unit operation and the extent to which dual
completion would be prejudicial to these plans. Five of them were
listed as future pumping wells, as to which it was indicated that
dual production was impracticable. The two others were listed for
future gas lift operation. For them, it was stated that there should
be installed additional specialized equipment, at the expense of
the Bartlesville Sand production, before the dual production
would be approved by the Unit. Obviously the performance of
the duties of S to F under the Agreement was seriously and substantially altered by the unitization, in a manner directly affecting
the propriety of the per-well deduction.
B. For the individual development and operation of the assigned tracts, the statute and the plan of unitization substituted
unitized operation of the entire source of supply embraced in the
Unit, without regard to lease boundaries or location of wells. Thus
the statute requires the plan of unitization to include provision for
the "efficient unitized management or control of the further development and operation of the unit area for the recovery of oil and
gas from the common source of supply affected." 48 The order creating the unit is to provide "for the unitization and unitized opera48 OKLA. STAT.

tit. 52, § 287.4(a) (1961).
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tion of the common source of supply or portion thereof described
in the order...." 49 "From and after the effective date" of the creation of a unit, "the operation of any well producing from the common source of supply or portion thereof within the unit area
defined in the order . . . except in the manner and to the extent
provided in such plan of unitization shall be unlawful and is hereby
prohibited." 50 Further provision was made for unitization of obligations arising under individual leases:
"Unit production as that term is used in this Act shall
mean and include all oil and gas produced from a unit area
from and after the effective date of the order of the Commission creating the unit regardless of the well or tract within the
unit area from which the same is produced." 51
"Operations carried on under and in compliance with the
plan of unitization shall be regarded and considered as a fulfillment of and compliance with all of the provisions, covenants, and conditions, express or implied, of the several oil
and gas mining leases upon lands included within the unit
area, or other contracts pertaining to the development thereof,
insofar as said leases or other contracts may relate to the common source of supply or portion thereof included in the unit
area." 52
The Plan of U nitization provides that its adoption and the
creation of the Unit "shall have the effect from and after the Effective Date hereof of unitizing all further development and operations for the production of Oil and Gas from the Unit Area and of
pooling and unitizing the production so obtained, all to the same
extent as if the Unit Area had been included in a single lease and
all rights thereunder owned by the Lessees in undivided interests. "58
C. For the obligation to drill wells on each tract in accordance
with the prudent operator rule, there is substituted a restriction of
drilling to such wells as the Unit Operating Committee may authorize. 54 The Plan of U nitization makes it the function of that
Committee to "determine the extent of drilling operations and
development to be carried on by the Unit Operator, including the
tit. 52, § 287.3 (1961).
tit. 52, § 287.7 (1961).
tit. 52, § 287.4(b) (1961).
tit. 52, § 287.9 (1961); see Plan § VI, at 4.
58 Plan § VI, at 8.
54 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.7 (1961).
40 OKLA. STAT.
ISO OKLA. STAT.
51 OKLA. STAT.
112 OKLA. STAT.
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approval or disapproval of the contemplated drilling, deepening,
plugging back, reconditioning, abandonment or the use to be made
of any well or wells." 515 "Wells drilled or operated on any part of
the unit area no matter where located shall for all purposes be
regarded as wells drilled on each separately-owned tract within
such unit area." 56 All this accords with the general principle of unit
operation, whereby development within the unitized tract, though
not on the leased premises, complies with the operator's obligation
to develop the leased premises; 57 but it is in diametric opposition to
the advantages secured to F by the provision of the Agreement for
the development of each tract in accordance with the obligation of
the prudent operator.
D. For the obligation to protect each tract against drainage
by wells on neighboring lands, there is substituted the bringing of
all production into hotchpot,58 and the principle that offsetting
obligations do not apply between tracts within the same unit. 511
E. For the obligation to operate each well to secure the maximum productivity allowable under the conservation laws, there is
substituted production from such wells and at such a rate as the
Unit Operating Committee shall determine.60 As to wells "making
water," operation shall be directed, not to achieve maximum productivity, but "to minimize water encroachment into the Unit
Area," and to "retard, control or effe'ctively utilize such water encroachment."61
F. For the obligation not to shut down any well producing oil
or gas in paying quantities, and for the stipulation that "all producing wells will be operated at all times," 62 there is substituted a
wholesale program of shutting in wells.63 These restrictions on pro1,5 Plan § VIII(2)(d).
56 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.9 (1961).
57 Hardy v. Union Producing Co., 207 La. 137,
58 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 287.4(b), 287.9 (1961).
59 Hood v. Southern Prod. Co., 206 La. 642, 19

20 So. 2d 734 (1945).
So. 2d 336 (1944).

60 Plan § VIII(2)(f).
61 Id. § XV(b).
62 Agreement § 5.
63 Thus section XV of the Plan of Unitization provides:

"(d) The oil produced from the Unit Area shall be produced from those wells .•• from
which the same can be obtained with the smallest loss or dissipation of reservoir energy
reasonably possible under practicable operating conditions as they may exist from time
to time.
"(e) Gas wells and wells which produce oil with gas-oil ratios found to be excessive in
relation to the gas-oil ratios of other wells producing oil from the Unit Area shall be
shut in or the production therefrom restricted in such manner as to make the most
effective utilization of the gas energy of the reservoir reasonably possible under practical
operating conditions as they may exist from time to time.
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duction were regarded as one of the most beneficial incidents of
this unitization.6¼
Moreover, the exception in the Agreement that wells are to
be shut in only "pursuant to an order, rule, or regulation of any
officer, board or agency, state or federal," 65 is superseded by the
authority granted to the Unit, as outlined above. This Unit clearly
is not a state or federal officer, board or agency, within the meaning
of the Agreement. By statutory definition, it functions "on behalf
and for the account of all the owners of the oil and gas rights within
the unit area ... to supervise, manage and conduct the further
development and operations for the production of oil and gas from
the unit area ...." 66 It holds possession of the property which it
uses in the course of its operations "as agent of the several lessees
67
• • • .''
It does not wield the governmental authority of the state
through the issuance of orders, rules or regulations. True, the Unit
is described as a "body politic and corporate," 68 and it does play an
important role in implementing Oklahoma's public policy to promote the conservation of oil and gas. But its general features approximate much more closely those of a private institution than
those of a public authority. It has been suggested that it is likely
that the analogies of private law, rather than those of public law,
will be applied to most of its dealings. 69 Indeed, the Unit engages
in the essentially private enterprise of developing and operating
an oil field under statutory authority. Yet its determinations may
shut in wells, contrary to the terms of the Agreement. While, for
the field as a whole, and in the long run, restrictions of this sort,
and of the other varieties previously discussed, may work out advantageously, it is obvious that, in connection with the hotchpot
distribution of proceeds, they seriously restrict the monthly income
apportionable to particular tracts. Thus they reduce the ability of
"(f) Gas (other than gas produced in connection with production of oil) shall be produced
from the Unit Area only at such time or times and in such manner as in the judgment
of the Operating Committee such gas may be produced without materially decreasing the
quantity of oil economically recoverable from the Unit Area."
64 "Unitization will immediately permit the selective production of wells. This will
result in a substantial reduction in the daily gas production and at the same time the
daily oil production from the field will be maintained at its present level or increased."
See Barnes, West Edmond's Unitization and Gas Injection Project Would Be One of
Largest, Oil and Gas J., Dec. 14, 1946, pp. 70, 71.
61S Agreement § 7.
66 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.8 (1961).
67 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.9 (1961).
68 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.8 (1961).
60 See Merrill, The Legal Status of a Statutory Oil and Gas Production Unit, 10
OKLA. L. REv. 249, 254 (1957).
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the overriding royalty share to sustain the per-well deduction as
compared with its ability to do so under operation on an individual basis according to the standards set by the Agreement.
G. For the "one-half of the crude oil, gas, casinghead gas and
other hydro-carbons produced, saved, and marketed from said
leasehold premises or the proceeds thereof accruing to the working
interests assigned or transferred hereunder" reserved to F by the
Agreement, the Plan of Unitization substitutes a similar share of
the "amount of the unit production allocated to each separatelyowned tract within the unit, and only that amount, regardless of
the well or wells within the unit area from which it may be produced, and regardless of whether it may be more or less than the
amount of the production from the well or wells, if any, on any
such separately owned tract." 70 This proportion is to be determined
by a formula which "will reasonably permit persons otherwise entitled to share in or benefit by the production from such separatelyowned tracts to produce or receive, in lieu thereof, their fair, equitable and reasonable share of the unit production or other benefits
thereof." This "fair, equitable and reasonable share of the unit
production shall be measured by the value of each such tract for
oil and gas purposes and its contributing value to the unit in relation to like values of other tracts in the unit, taking into account
acreage, the quantity of oil and gas recoverable therefrom, location
on structure, its probable productivity of oil and gas in the absence
of unit operations, the burden of operation to which the tract will
or is likely to be subjected, or so many of said factors, or such other
pertinent engineering, geological, or operating factors, as may be
reasonably susceptible of determination." 71 This allocation is set
up in Exhibit B to the Plan of Unitization and is approved and
adopted in section VII of the Plan.
In contrast to this scheme, by the law as it existed at the execution of the Agreement between F and S, the production realizable
from each separate tract was determinable by the "Law of Capture," limited only to the extent prescribed by the Oklahoma conservation laws.72 Under that law, the actual production from the
70 Plan § VI, at 4.
71 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.4(b)
72 "The law of capture, under

(1961).
which oil and gas is owned by the one lawfully reducing it to possession, still obtains in Oklahoma, except as it has been or may be regulated or restricted under laws passed in the exercise of the police power, such as the
proration and spacing statutes and city zoning ordinances. Those laws do not abrogate
the rule of capture." Gruger v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 192 Okla. 259, 262, 135 P.2d 485, 488
(1943). This opinion, filed Feb. 16, 1943, was the latest exposition of the law of Oklahoma
when the Agreement of August 20, 1943, was executed.
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various tracts, subject to conservation regulations, was limited only
by the diligence and the efficiency of the operations. S might capture more than the fair share of the tracts he was operating, if by
promptitude and skill he could do so.73 Such diligence and efficiency S had contracted expressly to exercise, by the provisions
heretofore set out. Had this not been provided, the law would have
imposed the duty by implication. 74
How different is the situation of F under the Plant As has been
aptly said, "With unitization, every operator and royalty owner
receives a fixed percentage of revenue from the entire field." 75 The
elements specified for determining the allocation of the proceeds
from this unitized operation differ entirely from, and are more
limiting than, the conditions of operation for which F contracted.
They materially and adversely affect the prospect of earning income
sufficient to cover the specified per-well deductions plus a substantial remainder for credit to the reserved override. This change
could not have been, by any stretch of the imagination, within the
contemplation of the parties in 1943 when the Agreement was
executed, since there was then no unitization law upon the books.
The trial court thought that the Agreement should not be
regarded as calling for "competitive exploitation," but rather as
contemplating the possibility of unitization and making no provision for the effect thereof on the provision for the per-well deduction. 76 This it deduced from the provision that paying wells should
not be shut in, except for repairs or reconditioning, "unless pursuant to an order, rule or regulation of any officer, board or agency,
state or federal." 77 The appellate court somewhat blunted the force
of this argument by saying that this clause referred to "governmental regulation in general and not to unitization exclusively,"
capping this off by saying that, in any event, the finding was unnecessary. 78 Concerning this last, the only comment we have to make
is that we are reminded of the lawyer whose argument was interrupted by the interjection from the bench, "That's not the law";
he responded, "It was until Your Honor just spoke." The statement
73

Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Larkins, 168 Okla. 69, 31 P.2d 608 (1934);

cf. Wood Oil Co, v. Corporation Comm'n, 205 Okla. 537, 239 P.2d 1023 (1950).

M Cosden v. Carter Wolf Drilling Co., 183 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1950); see MERRILL, op.
cit. supra note 29, § 188.
75 See Barnes, supra note 64, at 71.
76 See Peter Fox Brewing Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 189 F. Supp. 743, 755 (N.D.

III. 1960).
77 Agreement § 5.
78 See Peter Fox Brewing Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 296 F.2d 274, 280 (7th Cir.
1961).
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of the appellate court amounts to an assertion that the contemplation of the parties has no relevance to the interpretation of contractual language or to its continued effect when confronted by a
cataclysmic change in governmental policy. This position is unique,
to say the least.79
As to the notions that the contractual language referred either
to a unitization program specifically or to any conceivable sort of
governmental regulation that might be invented in the future, these
cannot stand when we realize that there were in effect at the time
the Agreement was formed numerous Oklahoma statutes relative
to prorationing of production, well-spacing, the prevention of
wasteful methods of production, and the like,80 under which wells
could be shut in. Leases and other contractual documents relating
to oil interests had long contained clauses designed to relieve operators from the risks that orders of this kind might be held insufficient
protection against liability for failure to perform their contractual
responsibilities. 81 Parties to these stipulations clearly would have in
mind the effects of orders of this sort upon the competitive operations with which they were familiar. It requires an extreme effort
of the imagination to assume that the provisions in question were
intended to preserve the deduction stipulations unaltered under a
regulatory regime diametrically opposed to the condition of exploitation under which these contracts were designed to operate.
H. The option of F to take over wells abandoned by S82 is in
conflict with many provisions of the statute and the Plan of U nitization, which, therefore, supersede it. Under the statute the Plan
is required to set up a basis "upon which wells, equipment and
other properties of the several lessees within the unit area are to
be taken over and used for unit operations," 88 thereby disabling S
from transferring abandoned wells and equipment to F. Moreover,
F could not take over abandoned wells to operate on an individual
basis, as contemplated by the Agreement, since "the operation of
any well producing from the common source of supply or portion
thereof within the unit area defined in the order by persons other
79 See 6 CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 30, §§ 1353-61; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1954 (Rev.
ed. 1938).
80 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 81-303 (1961).
81 See BROWN, On. AND GAs LEAsEs § 13.03 (1958); Merrill, Lease Clauses Affecting
Implied Covenants, in SOUTiiWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, SECOND ANNUAL lNSrITUTE ON
OIL AND GAS LAw AND TAXATION 141, 189 (1951); Terry, Miscellaneous Clauses in Oil and
Gas Leases, in id. at 237, 264 (1951).
82 Agreement § 14.
83 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.4(d) (1961).
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than the unit or persons acting under its authority or except in
the manner and to the extent provided in such plan of unitization
shall be unlawful and is hereby prohibited." 84 Wells to be abandoned are to be turned back only to the lessee, to be utilized only
"for the purpose of completing the same in some other formation
not a part of the Unit Area." 85 The lessee must "agree to assume full
responsibility for the proper plugging and abandonment thereof
at such time as the well is ultimately abandoned." 86 The incompatibility of these provisions with a surrender of such wells and their
equipment to F by S is apparent. F's option to take over wells
abandoned by S is so important a protection to the former against
the effects of the per-well deduction that it is impossible for us to
conceive how the courts below could have held that the deduction
provision survived its abrogation. Their opinions are regrettably
silent upon this most significant point. The learned courts below
make no reference to this destruction of the royalty owner's privileges correlative to the benefits granted the lessee, or to the incongruity that the one should survive and not the other.
From the recitation of the above items, it is clear that the law
and the plan of operation adopted under the law have abrogated
so many of the provisions of the Agreement governing the conditions under which the per-well deduction was to be made as completely to change the circumstances surrounding the operation of
the assigned properties and to alter to the detriment of F the obligations upon which he could rely to keep the production up to levels
which would assure a return to him after the per-well deductions
had been made. This calls into operation the principle that when
a change in law forbids the performance of an essential condition
of a contractual obligation, the obligation also ceases. 87

IV.

THE SUPERSEDING CHARACTERISTICS OF UNITIZATION

The supersession, by unitization, of agreements touching the
individual properties incorporated in the unit has been recognized
repeatedly by other courts.
In Griswold v. Public Serv. Co.,88 the Supreme Court of Okla-

a, OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.7 (1961).
Plan § XXIV.
Ibid.
Davidson v. Gaskill, 32 Okla. 40, 121 Pac. 649 (1913); accord, American Mercantile
Exch. v. Blunt, 102 Me. 128, 66 Atl. 212 (1906); Midwood Sanitarium v. Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co., 261 N.Y. 381, 185 N.E. 674 (1933); Cole v. Addison, 153 Ore. 688, 58 P.2d 1013
(1936).
88 205 Okla. 412, 415, 238 P.2d 322, 325-26 (1951).
811

86
87
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homa held that royalty provisions of individual leases were superseded by unitization, saying, "Their lease was communitized ...
and thereafter royalties were payable under the communitized
lease, and not under their lease."
In Beene v. Midstates Oil Corp.,89 the plaintiff was lessor under
a lease to the defendant which, in addition to the normal royalty,
reserved to the plaintiff an overriding royalty of an additional oneeighth, calculated on the production from each well separately,
which was to be reduced to one-sixteenth as to any well "for such
period ... as such well is not capable of producing 50 barrels of
oil per day when operated by a competent operator utilizing efficient and practicable methods and equipment for producing oil
and gas." Later, the lease was combined with other lands in a fieldwide unit. The plaintiff, as lessor, as well as the defendant, as lessee,
executed the unitization agreement. That agreement contained
provisions for the operation of the area as a unit; provided a formula for the apportionment of the unitized production among the
individual tracts; and specified that "payments to all Operators and
Royalty Owners are to be made on the basis of an assumed production in the amount or value of the Unitized Substances allocated
under the agreement to each Production Unit in lieu of the actual
production from each Production Unit" and that "payments made
upon the basis herein stipulated shall constitute full performance
of all obligations to pay rentals, royalties and all other sums whatsoever which may become payable to Royalty Owners. . . ." It
further provided, in language strikingly similar to that of the
Oklahoma statute,90 that "existing permits, leases, pooling agreements, drilling and operating contracts, overriding royalty agreements, or other instruments affecting the lands covered by this
agreement owned or held by the parties subscribing or consenting
hereto, shall continue in full force and effect to the extent that they
or any one or more thereof, are not in conflict with the provisions
of or are not modified by this agreement, but in case of conflict the
provisions of this agreement during its effectiveness shall govern
and control, and such other agreements shall be and the same are
hereby modified and amended accordingly.'' 91 Under the operations
in accordance with that agreement some wells were shut down,
some were used for water injection, and some were used for gas
injection. The point at issue between the plaintiff and the defendso 169 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1948).
90 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.9 (1961).
91 Beene v. Midstates Oil Corp., 169 F.2d

901, 906, 907 (8th Cir. 1948).
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ant was whether, as to certain wells to which the proportion assigned from the total unit production turned out at certain periods
to be less than fifty barrels per day, the override should be paid on
the basis of one-eighth or one-sixteenth for those periods. These
wells had produced better than fifty barrels per day prior to unitization, and it was the plaintiff's contention that they were still capable
of such production if operated on the basis prescribed in the lease.
The court, in denying their contention that payment should be on
the basis of one-eighth of the allocated return, said:
"The plan of the Agreement for consummating payment to
the royalty owner is complete and it is clear that all such payments shall be made on the basis of an assumed production
calculated and arrived at according to prescribed formula.
It precludes resort to other bases of calculation to arrive at
payments due any interested party by its specific provisions
and its whole scheme for production and calculation and distribution of benefits is inconsistent with and in contrast to
the use of actual or natural flow production of any well as a
basis of calculation of a royalty or overriding royalty interest.
The only basis contemplated for determining such interests is
the assumed basis produced by the technical method of reckoning set forth in minute detail in the Agreement. An allocation
made on that basis is the only measure of individual interest
contemplated by the Agreement.
"Such assumed basis is in conflict with the basis of calculation of payments provided in the royalty and overriding royalty provisions of the lease. Both the one-eighth royalty and
the one-eighth override were according to the lease to be calculated on the basis of the saved product of each well and admittedly the Agreement supersedes and supplies a new basis
for both those calculations, the new basis being the 'allocation'
provided for by the Agreement. The substitution of the 'allocation' for the former basis of actual production does not result
because of express words of substitution in the Agreement. It
follows from the conflict between the old basis defined in the
lease and the new basis defined in the Agreement and the
declaration of the Agreement that the new shall control over
the old." 02
The significance of the Beene decision, as applied to the problem here involved, is twofold. (1) The decision recognizes that the
supersession of individual agreements by the unitization plan, al112

Id. at 908.
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though stated, as in the Oklahoma statute, to be limited to instances
of conflict with or modification by the unitization plan, extends
to provisions which are not verbally in conflict with or modified
by the plan, but are necessarily involved with a method of exploitation which has been superseded by the plan. The continued capability of the wells to produce under the competitive conditions
contemplated by the lease could have been determined, just as, in
the instant situation, the per-well deduction can be determined.
But, in each case, the continued effectiveness of the stipulation is
inconsistent with the conditions of operation brought into play by
unitization. (2) The court expressly recognizes that unitization constitutes "a pooled operation aimed at getting the most out of the
area by efficient methods, excluding the concept of competitive
production from one well against another. . . ." 98 Consequently,
the provisions of a contract designed to operate under conditions
of competitive production, as the provisions of the Agreement of
August 20, 1943, have been shown to be intended, cannot survive
unitization.
In Waller v. Midstates Oil Corp., 94 the lessors had reserved an
overriding royalty in addition to the customary one-eighth. It was
provided that the override should cease, as to any drilling unit,
"when the well or wells on any such particular unit ceases to flow
oil without being pumped or produced by other artificial means."
At the time of unitization, all the wells on the premises were flowing, or were capable of flowing, oil, without resort to pumping or
to other artificial means. The unitization became effective, with the
assent of the lessors. Some of the wells in question were killed and
used for injection wells. The lessor contended "that the whole field
is being produced by mechanical means and that ended the excess
royalty due plaintiffs." The Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled to
the contrary, adopting the expressed opinion of the trial judge:
"[W]e think that since the individual leases with respect to the
production of oil therefrom have lost their identity, that of
necessity the leases lost their identity as excess royalty based
on the manner of production of oil from the leased premises,
and that the excess royalties were transferred from '7 / 8 of the
oil produced from the respective drilling units' to '7 / 8 of the
oil allocated to this drilling unit' just the same as the 1 / 18th
[sic] underlying royalty was handled. It would certainly be
unfair and unjust to the land owner to say to him that we have
98

94

Id. at 909.
218 La. 179, 48 So. 2d 648 (1950).
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drilled your wells and used them for injection wells and since
we are producing no oil from your lease, we will pay you no
royalty-they didn't say this; they said we will pay you on the
agreed percentage of production in the field just as if the oil
was produced from your well. There can be no sound reason
why the same procedure should not, and was not followed with
respect to overriding royalties. We think the agreement gives
the answer, it does." 95
The significant aspect of the case is that the court held that the provision relative to termination of the override, when wells cease "to
flow without being pumped or produced by other artificial means,"
had no continued validity after the operation of the field was
shifted, from the competitive basis in respect to which that provision was drafted, to a unitized basis. As the court said, "We think
that if defendant had said to plaintiffs, if you will sign this instrument, we will put the field on a mechanical basis, and that will stop
your overriding royalty, they would never have secured the signatures of these plaintiffs to the agreement." 96 So, here, had it been
said to F that the per-well deduction97 would survive the competitive operation of the assigned properties, the individual disposition of all produced hydro-carbons, and the effectiveness of the
eight distinct features of the contract, all of which facets tended to
assure to Fa productiveness from individual tracts adequate to support the deduction (yet all of which were superseded by unitization), we think it clear that F never would have assented to that
deduction.
We think that portion of section 4 of the Agreement which relates to the per-well deduction is so utterly inconsistent with the
program of development and operation set up for the West Edmond
Hunton Lime Unit by the statute and the Plan of U nitization
adopted therefor as to fall within the terms of the provision that
"Property rights, leases, contracts and all other rights and obligations shall be regarded as amended and modified to the extent necessary to conform to the provisions and requirements of this Act and
to any valid and applicable plan of unitization or order of the
Commission made and adopted pursuant hereto ...." 08
The courts below attempted to evade the force of this statutory
language by saying that the unitization did not render impossible
95
06
97
98

See Waller v. Midstates Oil Corp., supra note 94, at 196, 48 So. 2d at 654.
Ibid.
Agreement § 4.
OKI.A, STAT, tit. 52, § 297.9 (1961).
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the performance of the provision for the per-well deduction.99
This is true enough, in the sense that, as a matter of arithmetic,
the allowance can be ascertained, and can be deducted from the
share of the unit production allotted to each tract. But the functions
which this allowance was to fulfill' no longer are realizable. The suppositions on which it was based are gone with the old law. What
sort of justice is it which allows S to continue enjoyment of the
allowance after its utility has vanished? That its sole objective was
to compensate S for expenses in connection with operating under
conditions now eliminated by the statutory unitization we think is
manifest.
In the first place, this is made clear by the terms of the Agreement itself. Section 6 requires S to furnish F, monthly "a full, complete and itemized statement of all receipts and disbursements in
connection with the development and operation of the aforesaid
properties during the preceding calendar month and to permit F
at any time upon request to examine the books and records of S
or of its subsidiary operating said premises in so far as the same
pertain to such operations." Since F's override is a carried interest,
"free and clear of all development and operating expense," the
only need which F could have for such statements and for access
to the books and records of S relating to the development and
operation of the premises would be to determine the advisability
of exercising the two options reserved to F: (1) to eliminate from
the contract wells which run deficits for ninety days or more100
and (2) to take over wells which S determines to abandon.101 In
forecasting the probable future profitability of wells, the comparison of the operating expense with the gross income and the per-well
deduction would be of vital significance, from the standpoint of
both S and F. The existence of the deduction would be a factor
inducing S to continue operation of a well beyond the time when
otherwise it might desire to abandon or to turn it back; it would
also be a factor in the determination by F as to whether continued
operation, after the deduction was eliminated, would be profitable.
Similarly, the comparison of operating expense with income would
be of significance to F in appraising on the one hand whether deficits from a particular well likely would be permanent and, on the
other hand, whether, even with the per-well deduction, there was
99 See Peter Fox Brewing Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 189 F. Supp. 743, 760 (1960):
Peter Fox Brewing Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 296 F.2d 274, 280 (1961).
100 Agreement § 4(2).
101 Agreement § 13.
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likely to be a continuing operating loss which would lead S to proffer a return of the well. These factors would have a potent bearing
on the propriety of a determination to release a particular tract
from the override. The courts below seem nowhere to have given
cognizance to this aspect of the problem.
Again, the manner in which the deduction is established shows
its character as a contribution to operating expenses. The override
is set up first, "free and clear of all development and operating expense." When, therefore, something is taken from this "free and
clear" one-half, the deduction must be, in some form, a contribution, out of the part reserved, to expense. If the subtraction were
to be a mere cutting down of the original reservation, that could
have been accomplished more easily and more appropriately by
limiting the extent of the retention rather than by making the
reservation subject to a deduction. Also, the first item of subtraction, the one-half of the amount of an oil payment payable to
another oil company, clearly is a contribution to the expense of
exploitation of the leases from which the oil payment is due. The
principle "noscitur a sociis" is applicable to the interpretation of
contracts.102 "The whole of a contract is to be taken together, ...
each clause helping to interpret the others." 103 Finally, the increase
of the drawback by fifty dollars per month as to each well producing more than ten percent water shows clearly that the deduction
is intended as a contribution to operating expense, since the
presence of salt water in production necessitates additional expenditures for the separation and disposition of the water. 104
Moreover, the necessity of such a special provision for contribution to operating expense is obsolete under unitization. Unitization completely alters the conditions under which the field is
operated. By substituting cooperation for competition in development and production, unitized operation reduces costs and capital
outlays; at the same time, by increasing ultimate recovery, it adds to
the net profit of the producers. This is the recognized objective of
the Oklahoma unitization law. The Corporation Commission, in
order to establish a unit, is required to find that unitized operation
"will with reasonable probability result in the increased recovery of
substantially more oil and gas from the common source of supply
than would otherwise be recovered," and that the additional cost of
such operation "will not exceed the value of the additional oil and
102
103
104

See 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 618(3) (3d ed. 1961).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 157 (1961).
See CLOUD, PETROLEUM PRODUCTION 469-82, 501-11 (1937).
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gas so recovered." 105 The achievement of such results has been one
of the prime arguments of the advocates of unitized production
methods. It has been said that, because of the "economies ... realized through unitization, the small operator usually finds money
demands on him substantially smaller than under a system of
individual lease operation." 100 "Large economies result through
avoiding duplication of equipment, through centralized management, and in other ways." 107 Other writers lay stress upon the economies in development and operation costs realizable through unit
operation.108 Reports on established projects indicate that they
achieve this objective.100 Specifically, a similar consummation has
been asserted for the West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit. 110
The increased production accomplished by unitization was
achieved through the shutting down of over 200 wells, with a resultant reduction of the cost of operation, yet with a higher return to
the operators. According to a report made as of the close of 1952,
105

100
107

OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.3 (1961).
See Jacobs, Unit Operation of Oil and Gas Fields, 57 YALE L.J. 1207, 1223 (1948).
See Myers, Spacing, Pooling and Field-Wide Unitization, 18 MISS. L.J. 267, 271-72

(1947).
108 See CLOUD, op. cit. supra note 104, at 71; Caruthers, Procedures-Benefits-Problems-of Unitization, Oil and Gas J., July 28, 1949, pp. 302, 304•05; German, Compulsory
Unit Operation of Oil Pools, 17 A.B.A.J. 393, 399 (1931); Heath, Unitization Desirable in
Secondary Recovery, World Oil, Oct. 1949, p. 48.
109 See Gray, Five Years of Operating at Langlie Unitized Repressuring Project, Oil
and Gas J., Nov. 16, 1946, pp. 295, 297; Landis &: Brock, Four Case Histories Showing Why
It Pays To Unitize, Oil and Gas J., July 7, 1952, pp. 62, 63.
110 "For September, the last month prior to unitization, the field's allowable was
40,000 bbl. and production was 34,907 bbl. The unit asked the Corporation Commission
to grant an increase of 5,000 bbl. of oil a day and this was granted as of October 1. It
was planned to obtain this additional production by shutting in high-gas-oil ratio wells
and thus conserve this reservoir energy for increasing the productivity of the other wells
in the field. Thus 165 wells had been shut in by November 1, and by November 15 the
total had reached 225. For the month of October, the field produced a daily average of
46,331 bbl. or slightly in excess of the increased allowable. The report prepared on the
field by the West Edmond Engineering Committee stated that, through selective production alone, an additional 10 million barrels of oil will be recovered." McCaslin, Nation'3
Largest Unit Operation Accomplishes Much in First Three Months, Oil and Gas J., Jan.
I, 1948, pp. 44, 46.
"It has been estimated that without unitization, approximately 24 per cent of the total
wells in the pool would have been abandoned by 1952, and that by that time all producing wells would have been placed on the pump. By the end of 1957, all wells would
have been abandoned. Under Unitization, selectivity in shutting in of high-gas-oil-ratio
wells alone may extend the producing life to 1959 or later. With a gas-injection program
added, the producing life of the field should extend to 1965 or later."
"The 32 operating interests, the state, and the estimated 7,000 land and royalty owners
should all benefit from the unitization. During the hearings before the Corporation Commission, Don R. Knowlton, consulting engineer, stated that unit operation would mean an
additional $16,000,000 for royalty owners, and an additional $6,800,000 in gross production taxes for the state." Id. at 62, 63.
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the average daily production was 6,035 barrels. 111 This was produced through 506 wells, out of a total of 750 credited to the field.
Adding 15 water input wells, there were a total of 521 wells in
operation, with 229 not in operation. A total of I 02 wells were shut
in because of an uneconomically high gas-oil ratio; 19 were listed
as dead, of which three were tagged as not economical to correct.
Six wells were labeled as marginal artificial lift wells permanently
shut down; 77 were plugged and abandoned, and three more had
been approved for that purpose, while 22 more apparently were
abandoned for Hunton Lime production, being marked "returned
to former lessee." In brief, for the field as a whole, production was
being achieved through less than 70 percent of the total wells, as
against 76 percent to be expected in operation under competitive
conditions. The engineering estimate as to results under competitive production was that, by 1952, all producing wells would have
been placed on the pump, while actually, in December 1952, 337
wells, nearly two-thirds of the producing wells, were still flowing.
Of the total production, over 56.07 percent came from these flowing
wells. While under competitive conditions it was estimated that 24
percent of the wells would have been abandoned by this time, over
30 percent were not in operation under unitization. The saving in
operating costs resulting from these features of unitized operation,
as compared with competitive production, is obvious. For instance,
361 flowing wells cost only, on the average, 78 dollars each to operate in March 1953, whereas the average cost of operating 171 pumping wells in the same month was 328 dollars. The monthly operating cost of the unit declined from an average of 126,444 dollars
during 1948 to 83,062 dollars for the first four months of 1953.112
For future operations, with natural flow no longer available, the
Unit Operator contemplated employing two forms of gas lift, much
cheaper than pumping,. that could be applied efficiently only
through the unitized operation.118
These savings, of course, redound to those who actually bear
the expense of operation. This situation renders utterly obsolete
the contribution of a flat sum per well, calculated as a proper contribution to operating costs under competitive operation, to be
made by the interests which, under unitization, are denied the right
111

See Monthly Operations Report, ·west Edmond Hunton Lime Unit, December

1952.
112 See Analysis of Reservoir Performance, Operating Costs, and Future Operating
Program of West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit, June 1953, p. 145
113 Id. at 157•65.
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to enforce the obligation of diligence and skill in competitive production, as well as the special competitive advantages which might
inhere in their tracts' location, assured to them by the same Agreement which provided the per-well contribution to operating costs.
All the more is this true when, under unitization, the percentage applicable to their tracts is determined by many factors which have no
relation to the competitive position of particular tracts.
The inconsistence of the per-well deduction with the theory
and practice of unitized operation is well expressed in the following statement by one of the leading experts on such operations:
"Ultimate recovery is substantially independent of the well
spacing and of the number of wells drilled. It is time for the
industry to waken up to this fact and realize that only pressure
maintenance of reservoirs accomplishes maximum recovery.
The amount of recovery from a pool is not to be determined in
direct proportion to the number of wells drilled in proven
pools."114
An instance which clearly shows the distinction between unitized and competitive operations so far as the position of the overriding royalty owner is concerned is that of the salt water injection
program. This was undertaken in the hope that water :flooding
would materially increase the production of oil. It dated from
1949.115 The hope was disappointed.U6 Experience indicated that,
at the very most, the project broke even; and it may have resulted
in substantial losses of oil. It certainly trapped off large quantities
of gas.117 It impeded maximum recovery of oil in certain areas.118
As of 1953, it was proposed to abandon this program for other
methods of salt water disposal.119 Without unitization, this venture
into water-flooding could not have been made, and the owners of
royalty interests would have been saved the resultant losses.
To continue the life of the provision for deductions is also in
direct conflict with an Oklahoma statutory provision which (1) requires, as a prerequisite to an order establishing a unit, a finding by
the Corporation Commission, "that such unitization and adoption
of one or more of such unitized methods of operation is for the com114

See Kaveler, Progress Report on Unit Operation, Oil and Gas J., Nov. 8, 1951,

p. 316.
115 See Analysis of Reservoir Performance, Operating Costs, and Future Operating
Program of West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit, June 1953, pp. 13-16.
116 Id. at 40-52.
111 Id. at 52, 83, 122.
118 Id. at 82, 83.
119 Id. at 82-86.
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mon good and will result in the general advantage of the owners of
the oil and gas rights within the common source of supply or portion
thereof directly affected"; and (2) requires that the unit, the unitization, and unitized operation be "upon such terms and conditions
as may be shown by the evidence to be fair, reasonable, equitable
and which are necessary or proper to protect, safeguard and adjust
the respective rights and obligations of the several persons affected,
including royalty owners, owners of overriding royalties, oil and
gas payments, carried interests, mortgagees, lien claimants and
others, as well as the lessees."120
These quoted provisions specifically establish the legislative
intent that the effect of the altered conditions of development and
operation brought about by unitization and unitized operation be
beneficial to all interests concerned, including among such interests, by specific reference, "owners of overriding royalties." The
program is not intended to benefit the lessee interests alone. As
we read the opinions below, the continuance of the per-well deduction redounds exclusively to the advantage of the owner of the lessee
interest and to the disadvantage of the owner of the overriding
royalty interest. Therefore, it is in inescapable conflict with the provisions quoted, and, by the express command of another section,
the Agreement is "amended and modified to the extent necessary" 121
to conform to the provisions and requirements that the unitization
and the unitized operation be "for the common good and ... result
in the general advantage of the owners of the oil and gas rights
within the common source of supply," and that the "rights and
obligations of ... owners of overriding royalties ... as well as the
lessees" be protected, safeguarded and adjusted. 122
Reduction in the earning capacity of the royalty interests is a
common phenomenon of unitization. 123 A leading purpose of unified operation is to decrease immediate production through eliminating "the competitive race to produce." 124 This has been a chief
cause of opposition to unitization on the part of the owners of
royalty interests,125 an opposition which doubtless was one of the
120 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.3 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
121 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.9 (1961).
l!l2 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.3 (1961).
128 See Gregg v. Harper-Turner Oil Co., 199 F.2d 1, 5 (10th

Cir. 1952) (reduction from
$35-50 per month to $6-7); Smith v. Carter Oil Co., 104 F. Supp. 463 (W.D. La. 1952);
Garvin, The Effect of Field Unit Operation Upon the Royalty Interest and the Royalty
Under the Oklahoma Statute, 21 OKLA. B.A.J. 1793, 1795, 1797 (1950).
124 Oliver, Methods of Determining Relative Oil and Gas Content of Individual Land
Holdings in Common Pool, 17 A.B.A.J. 541 (1931).
125 See Heath, supra note 108, at 51; King, Pooling and Unitization of Oil and Gas
Leases, 46 Mrca. L. REv. 811, 827 (1948).
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strongest reasons for denying to the owners of such interests participation in proceedings for unitization under the original Oklahoma
statute.126 On the other hand, to achieve the reduction of operating
costs and the spreading of recovery over a long period, results repeatedly praised as objectives of unitization,127 at the expense of
reduced returns or of the continuance of provisions tailored for
conditions of competitive operation, as in the instant case, bears
unjustly upon the owners of royalty interests. The per-well deduction, for instance, when applied to a period of prolonged and gradually declining production at lowered operating cost, is capable of
wiping out entirely, through the closing years, the return to the
overriding royalty interest. Thus it destroys the advantage of extended productivity, which, it has been declared, is a feature which
justifies imposing upon the royalty owner a reduction in his "immediate or current receipts." 128 It seems clear that this is one of the
results the avoidance of which is intended by the Oklahoma statutory provision which we have quoted. It is noteworthy in this connection that the propaganda in favor of the formation of this unit
stressed the element of advantage to the royalty owners.129 There is
a strange irony in the fact that two courts should now uphold the
operating interest in combining pre-unitization contracts with
unitized operation to the detriment of those owners who were
given assurance of benefit. We think it clear that the continued
deduction under the Agreement conflicts with the statutory provisions above quoted, under the circumstances here presented.
There is another statutory provision which collides with the
continuance of the per-well deduction after unitization. This is
the prescription that the "division of interest or formula for the
apportionment and allocation of the unit production, among and
to the several separately-owned tracts within the unit area" shall be
"such as will reasonably permit persons otherwise entitled to share
in or benefit by the production from such separately-owned tracts to
produce or receive, in lieu thereof, their fair, equitable and reasonable share of the unit production or other benefits thereof. . . .
[U]nit production ... shall mean and include all oil and gas proSee Myers, supra note 107, at 274.
See Jacobs, supra note 106, at 1210, 1224; Kaveler, The Engineering Basis for and
the Results from the Unit Operation of Oil Pools, 23 TuL. L. REv. 331 (1949); Moses,
The Effect of Louisiana's Conservation Statute on the Doctrine of Implied Covenants
in Oil and Gas Leases, 27 TuL. L. REv. 313, 315 (1953); Myers, supra note 107, at 271-73.
128 Patterson v. Stanolind Oil 8: Gas Co., 182 Okla. 155, 77 P .2d 83, 89 (1938).
129 See Barnes, West Edmond's Unitization and Gas Injection Project Would Be One
of Largest, Oil and Gas J., Dec. 14, 1946, pp. 70, 71.
126
127
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duced from a unit area from and after the effective date of the order
of the Commission creating the unit regardless of the well or tract
within the unit area from which the same is produced."130
The Agreement provided that the per-well deduction should be
made from "one-half of the crude oil, gas, casinghead gas, and other
hydro-carbons produced, saved, and marketed from said leasehold
premises or the proceeds thereof accruing to the working interests
assigned and transferred hereunder." This enumeration comprised
the sum of production from individual leaseholds, developed and
operated on a competitive basis, under the compulsions of the
specific obligations heretofore quoted. That individual production
now has been wiped out by the statute and by the Plan of Unitization. Instead, there is apportioned to each leasehold a share of total
unit production, produced on a cooperative basis quite different
from that envisaged by the Agreement and distributed among the
tracts according to a formula based on elements entirely foreign to
the competitive system of exploitation which was to be the source of
each tract's yield under the Agreement. Consequently, the statute
and the Plan of Unitization have completely destroyed the source
from which the deduction was to come. They have substituted for
it something quite different, to which the flat per-well deduction has
no relevance and to which it is not adapted. In this respect, also, the
Agreement must "be regarded as amended and modified to the
extent necessary to conform to the provisions and requirements"
of the statute and the Plan of Unitization. In the words used in
Beene v. Midstates Oil Corp., these provisions "require the calculation of payments to be made ... on a basis different from and in
conflict with that contemplated by and provided in the Agreement."1s1
It has been said that under unitization the royalty owner has
"an interest in the entire field, whereas, before, his only interest was
in his particular well or wells.'' 132 A share in such general ownership
is in no way comparable with ownership of an interest in a particular tract under competitive production.
Another inconsistence between the Agreement and the scheme
of unitized operation is afforded by that portion of the Oklahoma
statute reading: "Wells drilled or operated on any part of the unit
area no matter where located shall for all purposes be regarded as
130
131
132

tit. 52, § 287.4(b) (1961).
169 F.2d 901, 909 (8th Cir. 1948).
See McCaslin, Preplanned Program with Royalty Owners Followed in Newest Unit
Project, Oil and Gas J., April 8, 1948, pp. 64, 65.
OKLA, STAT.
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wells drilled on each separately-owned tract within such unit
area." 133 If this statement means anything, it is that for all purposes,
including the computation of the per-well deduction, every one of
the wells in production in the unit is to be regarded as located on
each of the tracts embraced in the Agreement. This would boost
the deduction to such astronomic proportions as obviously to be
impractical. Clearly, the legislature would not intend this. Since the
statute requires the application of the quoted concept "for all
purposes," there is no way in which the per-well deduction may
stand in harmony with it. Necessarily, then, it must be eliminated
from the Agreement by the prescription that "contracts, and all
other rights and obligations shall be regarded as amended and
modified to the extent necessary to conform to the provisions and
requirements of this Act."
Let us now look to another portion of the Oklahoma Compulsory
Unitization Statute, which establishes a statutory scheme for the
distribution and payment of the operating expenses of the unit.111*
First, the statute allots one-eighth of the unit production to be dis1ss OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.9 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
lSi "The obligation or liability of the lessee or other owners of the oil and gas rights
in the several separately-owned tracts for the payment of unit expense shall at all times
be several and not joint or collective and in no event shall a lessee or other owner of
the oil and gas rights in the separately-owned tract be chargeable with, obligated or
liable, directly or indirectly, for more than the amount apportioned, assessed or otherwise
charged to his interests in such separately-owned tract pursuant to the plan of unitization
and then only to the extent of the lien provided for in this Act.
"Subject to such reasonable limitations as may be set out in the plan of unitization,
the unit shall have a first and prior lien upon the leasehold estate and other oil and gas
rights (exclusive of a one-eighth (l/8) royalty interest) in and to each separately-owned
tract, the interest of the owners thereof in and to the unit production and all equipment
in the possession of the unit, to secure the payment of the amount of the unit expense
charged to and assessed against such separately-owned tract. The interest of the lessee or
other persons who by lease, contract or otherwise are obligated or responsible for the
cost and expense of developing and operating a separately-owned tract for oil and gas
in the absence of unitization, shall however, be primarily responsible for and charged
with any assessment for unit expense made against such tract and resort may be had to
overriding royalties, oil and gas payments; royalty interests in excess of one-eighth (1/8)
of the production, or other interests which otherwise are not chargeable with such cost,
only in the event the owner of the interest primarily responsible fails to pay such assess•
ment or the production to the credit thereof is insufficient for that purpose. In the event
the owner of any royalty interest, overriding royalty, oil and gas payment or other interest
which under the plan of unitization is not primarily responsible therefor pays in whole
m:: in part the amount of an assessment for unit expense for the purpose of protecting
such interest, or the amount of the assessment in whole or in part is deducted from the
unit production to the credit of such interest, the owner thereof shall to the extent of
such payment or deduction be subrogated to all of the rights of the unit with respect to
the interest or interests primarily responsible for such assessment. A one-eighth (1/8) part
of the unit production allocated to each separately-owned tract shall in all events be
regarded as royalty to be distributed to and among, or the proceeds thereof paid to, the
royalty owners free and clear of all unit expense and free of any lien therefor." OKLA.
STAT. tit. 52, § 287.8 (1961).
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tributed to the royalty owners in each separately owned tract, proportionately to the tract's allocation of production, "free and clear
of all unit expense and free of any lien therefor." Second, the cost
of operation is to be apportioned to each tract. In the West Edmond
Hunton Lime Plan of Unitization, such apportionment is in "proportion to the percentage of interest of such tracts in and to the
Unit .... " 135 Payment of this charge is secured by a lien in favor
of the unit upon all the interests in the tract exceeding the amount
allotted as royalty. Third, the primary responsibility for the assessed
operating expenses is upon the lessee's or operator's interest, and
"resort may be had to overriding royalties ... only in the event
the owner of the interest primarily responsible fails to pay such
assessment or the production to the credit thereof is insufficient
for that purpose." If the owner of an interest thus secondarily liable
pays any part of a unit expense assessment in order to protect his
property, he is subrogated to the rights of the unit against the
interest "primarily responsible for such assessment."
In brief, the law establishes a pattern whereby the one-eighth
royalty interest is clear of all liability for unit expenses, even if it is
owned by the operator himself. The remaining seven-eighths interest is chargeable, proportionately, with the unit expense; but, as
between the operator's interest and overriding royalties or other
non-operating interests, a real suretyship136 is created, whereby the
holders of the non-operating interests are entitled to be reimbursed
out of the operating interest for any payment made to discharge
the assessment, and are subrogated, to that extent, to the lien of
the unit against the operating interest.
The inconsistence of this statutory scheme with section 4(b)
of the Agreement is manifest. The statute imposes full secondary
liability upon the override for all expense chargeable to the tract.
The Agreement provides for a fl.at deduction of a specific sum,
beyond which no responsibility attaches. The statute limits responsibility to the proportionate share of the expenses chargeable
against the tract. The Agreement provides for a fixed deduction,
no matter how little the expenses. The statute creates a lien in favor
of the unit against the override, which therefore may be foreclosed
upon and sold to satisfy the expense. The Agreement creates no
such liabilty against the override; it merely allows deficits to be
carried over and to be taken out of future credits from production.
181i

Plan § XI.

136 See STEARNS, SURETYsHIP §

1.3 (5th ed. 1951).
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The statutory liability is limited to each separate tract; the Agreement deduction is combined as to all tracts and is subtracted from
"the gross proceeds of production accruing to the working interests
from all wells on all of the leases" subject to the Agreement. The
statutory liability is secondary, as we have seen; the Agreement
deduction is absolute and cannot be shifted.
The inconsistence of the statutory scheme and the Agreement
is such that the latter cannot coexist practicably and justly with the
former. In some respects the statute is more favorable to the overriding royalty interest than is the Agreement. In other respects it
is more burdensome. Of course, in those respects in which the
Agreement is more burdensome to the override than is the statute,
the owner of the override is caught in a "heads I win, tails you
lose" proposition wholly inconsistent with an express statutory
policy that the unitization and unitized operation shall be "fair,
reasonable and equitable" and shall be such as to "protect, safeguard and adjust the respective rights and obligations of ... owners
of overriding royalties ... as well as the lessees." 137 The Agreement
provision for deductions, therefore, must yield in its entirety to the
statutory arrangement.
That the statutory scheme is intended to supersede special
agreements and arrangements with regard to liability for operating
expenses is stated by Mr. T. Murray Robinson, a leading proponent
of the statute and long a member of the legal committee of the
Interstate Oil Compact Commission:
"On the theory that all tracts should be treated alike, the Oklahoma Legislature made a realistic division [in the statute] of
lessor and lessee interests in the production. It provides that
a one-eighth of the unit production be free and clear of all unit
expense and creates a lien against the remaining seveneighths interest in the unit tract and the production attributable to that tract for the payment of development and operating costs." 188
Concerning the necessity for cutting across prior arrangements,
Mr. Robinson said:
"Obviously, situations will arise in which some of the tracts'
share of the production can be obtained only by requiring
137 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.3 (1961).
138 See Robinson, Compulsory Unit Operation: Procedure, Proof, Validity and Legal
Effect, in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS
LAW AND TAXATION 201, 219 (1951).
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other tracts to contribute a greater share of the unit costs than
their share of the production. Ordinarily this out-balance may
be of little consequence in the earlier years of unit operation,
but it may become substantial and destructive to the unit as it
approaches its economic limit of operation. The failure of the
laws [in some states] to establish a yardstick by which the
lessors' and the lessees' interests are to be measured opens the
door for making of deals in anticipation of unitization which
easily result in unconscionable advantages to the cunning."189
It may be added to this statement that, as our prior discussion
reveals, the same unconscionable advantages may result from attempts to apply to unitized operation, and the limitations it imposes, provisions which were drafted with a view to competitive
conditions of exploitation. This is quite regardless of any degree
of Machiavellianism in either of the contracting parties and illustrates the wisdom of holding prior arrangements of this sort to
be superseded by a specific statutory plan.
As to the position of overrides, Mr. Robinson said: "The owner
of such an override receives his share of the production without cost
so long as his lessee pays, and until the unit forecloses its lien
against the seven-eighths interest." 140
That the Supreme Court of Oklahoma agrees that the statutory
policy with respect to the allocation of operating expense is intended to be all-embracing and to supersede private contractual
arrangements is indicated by its opinion in Palmer Oil Corp. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co. 141 In this case the Supreme Court of Oklahoma upheld the constitutionality of the original Oklahoma Compulsory Unitization law, which, as to the provisions now under
discussion, was identical with the statute now in force. The particular point of significance to us is the court's response to a contention
that, in limiting the royalty interest which should be free of responsibility for operating expense to one-eighth, the statute cut down
prior agreements for a greater royalty which existed in some instances. The court replied:
"Considering, as we must, that the one-eighth royalty prescribed is reasonable to accomplish the overall purpose, it follows that the right to the exceptional royalty as such must yield
to the extent it militates against the plan but should be preserved to the extent it may be done consistently with such plan.
130
HO
141

Id. at 220.
Id. at 221.
204 Okla. 543, 231 P.2d 997 (1951).
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We hold that the Act gives full recognition to such right and
only varies the method prescribed in the lease for its enjoyment. Prior to unitization such a lessor would be entitled to
receive the entire royalty share free from the cost of production. The enjoyment of this right, however, was based upon the
obligation of the lessee to produce and so deliver. Under the
unitization such obligation obtains upon the unit to the extent of a one-eighth royalty and the obligation of the lessee to
account for the remainder is recognized and declared. The
liability of any excess royalty is made possible because for the
plan of operation it is accorded the status of a leasehold interest. But by reason of the lease contract treating it as royalty
the liability is made secondary, and could only obtain where
there was a breach of the obligation of the lessee to discharge
the operation cost allowable thereto as part of the leasehold
interest. " 142
Because of the special nature of leasehold royalty interests, the
specific application of this language is not in point. Its significance
lies in the fact that the court recognized that the statute overcomes
a prior contractual stipulation concerning the royalty interest,
avaries the method prescribed in the lease for its enjoyment," and
provides that the liability of the non-operating interest in the seveneighths production "is made secondary." It seems clear that the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma would likewise hold that the statute
varied the method prescribed in the Agreement now under consideration for the overriding royalty's participation in liability for
operating expense, rendering that liability secondary in character
and to be measured by the share of unit expenses apportioned to
each tract. To hold otherwise would stack the cards against the
overriding interest.
The decision in Waller v. Midstates Oil Gorp. 148 offers an apt
analogy. There, a lease provision that an overriding royalty should
cease when wells ceased to flow oil without being pumped or produced by other artificial means was held to be superseded by a
subsequent unitization agreement containing a provision for dealing with "excess royalities" under certain circumstances. This was
in spite of the fact that the effect of the unitization was to cause
the entire field to be produced by "artificial means." The court
felt that the provisions as to excess royalties must have been in142

Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., supra note 141, at 551, 231 P.2d at

1006.
143

218 La. 179, 48 So. 2d 648 (1950).

1964]

COMPULSORY

U NITIZATION

415

tended to supersede completely the lease provisions as to termination of the override. There is a similar incongruity here between
the statutory provisions for operating expenses and the conditions
of unitized operation, on the one hand, and the Agreement provision for deductions and the conditions of competitive operation on
the other. We feel that the latter cannot stand concurrently with the
former, and so must be completely superseded, as the statute prescribes.
It may be suggested that the per-well deduction is continued in
force by the provisions which (I) make "primarily responsible" for
assessments any "interest ... of other persons who by . . . contract
or otherwise are obligated or responsible for the cost and expense
of developing and operating a separately owned tract" and (2) restrict the ultimate exemption to those interests "which otherwise
are not chargeable with such cost."144 It will be argued that the 200
dollars per month per-well deduction makes the overriding royalty
interest "by contract ... obligated or responsible for the cost of
developing and operating" the tracts, pro tanto, and makes it
"otherwise . . . chargeable with such cost." This, however, is
untenable. The key words, "obligated," "responsible," and "chargeable," are all applied to the cost of development and operation
under competitive conditions. These words, in legal significance,
always have the meaning of a direct and legally enforceable duty
with respect to the subject-in this instance the payment of the
operating costs to those who furnished the necessary service and
materials.
Clearly, the Oklahoma legislature must have been cognizant of
the legal meaning of the terms it used. It must have meant by persons or interests "responsible," "obligated," and "chargeable" with
respect to costs of development and operation, the persons or interests to whom the laborers, materialmen, and supply houses furnishing the labor and the articles could look for the enforcement ·ot
their claims. This would not include the overriding royalty interest, with respect to this deduction. Had S failed to pay some part of
the costs under competitive operation as to any one of these tracts,
the creditor could not have secured judgment against the owner of
the override for that amount, or for any part of his claim. He could
not have subjected the override to his demands, even secondarily, as
the Unit can now do. The deduction does not impose a liability
upon the override interest for the cost of operation. S is under no
144 OKLA. STAT.

tit. 52, § 287.8 (1961).
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obligation to devote that particular sum to defraying the operating
costs. The motive for permitting-it, as we have seen, is no doubt to
reimburse S for part of the operating costs; but it does not impose
on F, or his interest, a liability, a responsibility, an obligation, or a
charge with respect to those costs, any more than an indemnity
insurer is directly liable to those persons whom his insured may
injure.145 This interpretation accords with the practical construction of the act by the Unit and the Unit Operator, S. If the override
were regarded as chargeable directly with operating costs, the
owners would be billed therefor. They are not. The assessment is
made against S.
The conclusion, it seems clear to us, is that the decisions below
are erroneous. Let the judgment be that they stand condemned in
the High Court of Juristic Review.

J.,146 concurring.

There are a few points to which I
wish to call attention, in addition to the matters discussed by the
Chief Justice. With his expressions I am in complete accord. But
the learned judge who sat in the district court seemed to be troubled
by the failure of the owners of the F interests to protest the conduct
of the defendants at an earlier date, 147 although he absolved them expressly from any imputation of laches.148 To this, I have only to say
that the delay certainly brought about no change of position on the
part of Sand occasioned it no harm. On the contrary, if this court is
right in its conclusion that the provision for deductions was nullified by the change to unitized operation, all the delay entailed was
the benefit to Sin using money which it should have paid to F. No
estoppel or other bar can be charged against F for merely accepting
what was due in any event.149
The court of appeals unfortunately treated the problem posed
by the case as requiring solution solely on principles of private contract law, as is shown by the statement: "We do not deem relevant
the argument advanced concerning the relative profits of the
parties. The rights of parties fixed by contract are not governed
by comparing their subsequent relative gains or losses." 150 This
A1ANLI,

See VANCE, INSURANCE§ 135 (3d ed. 1951).
Of Choctaw derivation, substantially meaning justice.
See Peter Fox Brewing Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 189 F. Supp. 743, 762 (N.D.
Ill. 1960).
148 Id. at 754.
149 Elliott v. Pure Oil Co., 10 Ill. 2d 146, 139 N.E. 2d 295 (1957).
150 See Peter Fox Brewing Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 296 F.2d 274, 281 (7th Cir.
1961).
145
146
147
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hardly will do when there is superimposed upon the private bargain a plan of operation dictated by a statute so shot through, as is
the Oklahoma Compulsory Unitization Law, with an intent to hold
even the balance as between the several types of ownership into
which the mineral interest in the oil country customarily is divided.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has recognized this intent, and
has undertaken to effectuate it in other situations which have
come before it for determination. 151 It is difficult for me to conclude
that it would not have shown a similar alertness to legislative purpose in this instance. It is unfortunate that the occasion for passing
upon the effect of the statute should have arisen before judges so
distant from the scene alike as to geography, as to familiarity with
the type of operations involved,152 and as to the concern of the
Oklahoma legislators for maintaining a balance among varied
interests. 153
In the light of the expressed legislative concern to preserve
all interests in a fair adjustment, the assumption of the court of
appeals, of dubious propriety at best, that the Agreement contemplated the application of regulatory limits, even under statutes
then unenacted, 154 becomes irrelevant. The truly relevant proposition is that the lawmakers specifically provided that the various
interest-holders should receive "their fair, equitable, and reasonable share of the unit production or other benefits thereof" 155 and
that "property rights, leases, contracts, and all other rights and
obligations shall be regarded as amended and modified to the extent
necessary to conform to the provisions and requirements of this
Act .... "156
It is equally irrelevant, in the light of this language, that the
commission-approved Plan of Unitization did not make specific
151 "The unit organization with its operator stands in a position similar to that of a
trustee for all who are interested in the oil production either as lessees, or royalty owners." Young v. West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit, 275 P.2d 304, 309 (Okla. 1954). It is
obvious that the conduct of the operator in this case toward the F interests cannot be
reconciled with that of a trustee. "In our opinion, it is more important to secure to each
lessor, lessee, and owner of mineral rights in a field, his ratable share of the production
therefrom . . . than it is to secure to some, the maximum profits from drilling and producing operations." Application of Peppers Refg. Co., 272 P .2d 416, 424 (Okla. 1954).
152 No state in the Seventh Circuit possesses a compulsory field-wide unitization law.
lli3 Oklahoma has been from its inception an equalitarian commonwealth, and its
laws and institutions should be interpreted in the light of this historic base. See Merrill,
The Administrative Law of Oklahoma, 4 OKI.A. L. REv. 286, 287 (1951). This background
reinforces the manifest intent of the Oklahoma legislature.
154 See Peter Fox Brewing Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 296 F.2d 274, 279 (7th Cir.
1961).
ms Okla. Stat. tit. 52, § 287.4(b) (1961).
156 Okla. Stat. tit. 52, § 287.9 (1961).
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provision concerning the per-well deduction portions of the Agreement, although the court of appeals seems to regard this as most
significant.157 The statute strikes down any provision which does not
preserve to the several interest holders their "fair, equitable and
reasonable share" of the various "benefits" under unitized operation. What the unitization plan may provide or fail to provide is
completely beside the point. This makes of decisive significance all
those considerations of justice, fairness, and economic hardship
which both courts below too lightly dismissed as unworthy of attention.·
157

1961).

See Peter Fox Brewing Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 296 F.2d 274, 280 (7th Cir.

